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Randall W. Eberts

Local Observations on a National Issue

' entral to the current welfare
reform debate is how best to get people
off welfare and into jobs. The current
choice is between long-term training and
education and short-term job search
assistance and employability skills.
Previous attempts at revamping the
welfare system, such as the JOBS
program under Family Support Act of
1988 and the Work Incentive (WIN)
program in the early 1980s, emphasized
longer-term training and education. While
these programs have proven to have
significant but modest impacts for
participants, they are relatively more
expensive and time consuming than rapid
employment programs. Current thinking
in Washington and among many states is
moving in the direction of short-term job
search assistance as the preferred way off
welfare.
Several states have not waited for
Congress to come to any conclusion.
Michigan started a program, called Work
First, in October 1994 that focuses on
providing AFDC recipients with shortterm job search assistance and
employability skills. The Upjohn Institute
administers the Work First program,
along with six JTPA training programs for
the local area. One of the JTPA programs,
Title II-A adult training program, is
targeted to the economically

disadvantaged, many of whom are
welfare recipients.
Work First and the JTPA training
programs apply different philosophies to
pursuing the common goal of getting
people into jobs. The first stresses rapid
job placement; the latter emphasizes longterm job retention and career mobility. No
rigorous analysis of Work First has been

Comparing the performance of
Work First and the JTPA II-A
training programs offers some
insight into whether short-term
employability skills alone are as
effective as longer-term skills
training in getting welfare
recipients back to work.

conducted. However, the fact that the two
programs are administered
simultaneously by the Institute and that
they serve clients with similar
characteristics in the same local labor
market presents an opportunity to make a
few preliminary comparisons. This
articles compares performance measures
of the two programs to offer a few
(continued on p. 3)
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From the
Executive Director
This year, to help celebrate its 50th
Anniversary, the Upjohn Institute
inaugurated a dissertation award for the
best Ph.D. thesis on employment-related
issues. The response was tremendous. We
received many excellent dissertations
from students who wrote on a variety of
topics. To reflect the Institute's mission of
pursuing policy-relevant research,
committee used the following criteria to
evaluate the dissertations: policy
relevance, technical quality of the
research, potential impact on real-world
employment problems, and presentation.
An important consideration in the
selection was balance among the four
criteria. Some dissertations were clearly
superior with respect to technical
competence but were not as relevant to
employment policy; others stood out in
addressing burning policy issues but were
not as central to employment issues.
I am pleased to announce that the firstprize winner of the 1995 Dissertation
Award is David Jaeger of the University
of Michigan. The two honorable mention
recipients are Anne Morrison Piehl of
Princeton University and Matthew
Slaughter of MIT.
David Jaeger, now at the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, wrote three essays that
examine the role of educational and skill
attainment in the labor market. One of his
essays, "Skill Differences and the Effect
of Immigrants on the Wages of Natives,"
addresses whether the influx of immigrant
labor during the 1980s has had a
significant effect on the wage structure of
natives. The increase in immigration is
one of several explanations put forth for
the decline in real wages among lowskilled workers and for the increase in the
wage gap between workers of different
education levels during the last two
decades. However, previous studies have
yielded mixed conclusions. Mr. Jaeger
approaches this issue in two steps. He first
finds that immigrants and natives within
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narrow skill levels are nearly perfect
substitutes in production. Based on this
finding, he then estimates a production
function to examine the effects of changes
in the supply of immigrants on the wage
structure of natives. He finds that
immigration accounts for nearly half the
decline in real wages among high school
dropouts, but contributes little to the
growing wage gap between high school
and college educated natives. These
impacts differ markedly across cities,
with immigration into Miami, Los
Angeles, and San Francisco having the
largest effect on wages.

Institute Celebrates
50th Anniversary
by Announcing
Winners of its
Dissertation Award
Mr. Jaeger's second essay, "Degrees
Matter: New Evidence on the Sheepskin
Effects in the Returns to Education,"
addresses a problem that has plagued
labor economists when estimating the
advantage of education on earnings. Most
data sets record only years of education,
but the number of years of schooling does
not necessarily indicate when and if a
degree has been obtained. Using a unique
data set that has actual records of degrees
obtained along with years of education,
Mr. Jaeger finds that the estimated
diploma effect is significant. For example,
a bachelor's degree earns 33 percent more
than simply four years of "some college."
Anne Piehl, who is now at Harvard
University's Kennedy School, confronts
the mounting problem of what can be
done to curb the increase in criminal
behavior, particularly among the lowereducated. As she states in her dissertation
entitled Economic Issues in Crime Policy,
expanding prison populations and the

lingering skepticism about the
effectiveness of rehabilitation have led to
the development of less-expensive modes
of supervision. Professor Piehl's
dissertation provides strong evidence that
education does reduce criminal behavior.
She shows that inmates who have
completed an adult basic or high school
education program while in prison are
significantly less likely to be
reincarcerated four years after release.
Also, recidivism is lower for those
inmates with higher levels of education
before entering prison. She also finds that
youths with more schooling are less likely
to commit crimes and be convicted. In
addition, her results suggest that public
perception that immigration is associated
with higher crime rates is unfounded.
Matthew Slaughter, a professor at
Dartmouth University, investigates
whether international trade has
contributed to sluggish real wage growth
and increasing wage inequality during the
last two decades. The title of his first
chapter, "International Trade and
American Wages in the 1980s: Giant
Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup?" reflects
the rhetoric and perceptions expressed
during the last presidential election.
Professor Slaughter finds no support for
these concerns. Rather, slow wage growth
and rising wage inequality result from
sluggish labor-productivity growth in the
service sector and skill-biased
technological change, domestic factors
not foreign ones. His second chapter,
"International Trade, Multinational
Corporations, and American Wage
Divergence in the 1980s," finds that
outsourcing by multinationals has little to
do with America's wage divergence.
The selection committee would like to
commend the three winners and also
thank everyone who submitted thesis
summaries for consideration. We
appreciate all the applicants' dedication in
pursuing high quality research that offers
valuable insights into current employment
issues. We look forward to next year's
competition.
Randall W. Eberts
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Welfare to Work
(continued from p. 1)

observations about the relative
effectiveness of short-term employability
skills versus longer-term skills training in
getting welfare recipients into jobs. We
then compare these measures with more
rigorous evaluations of other similar
programs.

Work First
Since October 1994, AFDC applicants
or current AFDC recipients who meet
certain criteria are required to be referred
to their local job training agency. For
welfare recipients in Kalamazoo and St.
Joseph Counties, the local training agency
is the Upjohn Institute. The Institute in

Michigan's current welfare
system offers welfare recipients
incentives to search for and
accept jobs.... Participation in
Work First is mandatory for
eligible welfare recipients.
Those who refuse to participate
may find their welfare checks
and food stamps cut by 25
percent.
turn subcontracts with various
organizations to provide the actual
services.
The purpose of the Work First
activities and services is to provide
participants the skills, support and
encouragement, and opportunities to
obtain employment in the shortest
possible time. Under Work First, each
person develops a resume and receives
instruction on proper techniques for
completing applicants and interviewing
for jobs. After clients complete the core
services, they are expected to search
intensively for work and accept offers that
provide at least 20 hours of work per
week at or above minimum wage. More
extensive assessment and skill training is
available through the local JTPA

programs, but these services are reserved
for those who have extreme difficulty
finding a job.
Michigan's current welfare system
offers welfare recipients incentives to
search for and accept jobs. They are
allowed to keep the first $200 they earn
each month and 20 percent over that
without reducing their welfare payments.
Clients are provided with transportation
until they receive their first paycheck, and
they receive health care, child care and
other benefits for the first year after
securing employment. Participation in
Work First is mandatory for eligible
welfare recipients. Those who refuse to
participate may find their welfare checks
and food stamps cut by 25 percent.
The II-A programs also serve welfare
recipients, but emphasize longer-term
training. As shown in table 1, the primary
difference between the core activities of
Work First and II-A is the longer-term
training: occupational skills training and
on-the-job training. Work First
participants spend an average 3.5 weeks
in the program, while II-A participants
spend around 45 weeks. Another
difference is that II-A offers more
intensive job development services than
Work First. Not all Work First
subcontractors have offered job
development services and some that do
offer such service do not have separate
staff designated for that purpose. This
coming year the state is requiring
subcontractors to provide job
development services. Therefore,
comparing the performance of Work First

and the JTPA II-A training programs
offers some insight into whether shortterm employability skills alone are as
effective as longer-term skills training in
getting welfare recipients back to work.

Comparing Program Performance
Experience in our two-county area last
year shows that welfare recipients who
participated in the II-A program had a
slightly better chance of finding a job than
Work First participants. However, the
margin was not very large. Sixty-five
percent of Work First participants were
employed at the end of training versus 71
percent of II-A participants (table 1). II-A
participants had a greater edge in wages
and hours worked. II-A participants found
jobs paying $6.69 an hour and worked an
average of 35.3 hours per week, while
Work First clients who found jobs were
paid $5.42 an hours and worked 30 hours
a week. Consequently, the weekly
earnings of Work First participants were
only 70 percent of those of II-A
participants.
Welfare recipients from both programs
were equally likely to hold a job during
the first few months after placement.
Ninety days after job entry, 60 percent of
clients from each program were still
employed. However, during the threemonth period, Work First participants
experienced slightly higher wage growth
and a greater increase in weekly hours
than II-A participants. Yet, these marginal
gains did very little to close the gap
between the two groups. After 90 days, IIA participants earned considerably more

Table 1. Core Activities of Work First and JTPA II-A Programs
Work First

II-A

Employability skills

X

X

Job search training

X

X

Job club

X

X

Placement services

X

X

Some

X

Activities

Job development
Occupational skills training

X

On-the-job training

X

Employment Research
than Work First participants ($250 per
week versus $176 per week).

Evaluations of Other Programs
These results are consistent with those
obtained from evaluations of welfare-towork programs that use randomized
experiments. In their review of these
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of the Riverside County, California GAIN
program to job development activities.
Evaluations of the program reveal 40
percent gains in earnings and significant
increases in employment rates for eligible
AFDC recipients compared to those in the
control group. The GAIN programs
offered by other California counties that

Table 2. Performance Measures of Work First and JTPAII-A Programs

Work First

II-A
(welfare
recipients)

Employment rate

65%

71%

Employment rate 90 days after placement

60%

60%

Hourly wage at initial placement

$5.42

$6.69

Hourly wage 90 days after placement

$5.61

$6.95

Hours worked per week at initial placement

30.0

35.3

Hours worked per week 90 days after placement

31.4

36.0

Weekly earnings at initial placement

$162.90

$232.14

Weekly earnings 90 days after placement

$176.10

$250.13

Performance measures

evaluations, Gueron and Pauly (1991)
conclude that "selective-voluntary
programs that provided higher-cost or
more intensive services appeared to get
people into jobs with somewhat higher
pay, but did not make a consistent
difference in the proportion of people
employed" (p. 27).
However, the difference in outcomes
between Work First and II-A may result
from factors other than the difference in
length and type of training. One
difference could be the more extensive
job development services offered to II-A
clients. Professional job developers are
likely to have better results in placing a
client, since they typically have
established rapport with employers, act as
the client's advocate, and through
experience can offer a better match of
client to job.
Evaluation of California's welfare-towork program, GAIN, suggests that job
development makes a difference. Many
experts attribute the phenomenal success

did not stress job development had more
modest gains.
In addition, because II-A is a voluntary
program, the skills and motivation of
participants in II-A and Work First may
differ. Without a rigorous experimental
evaluation, it is impossible to tell how
much differences in client mix in the two
programs may influence the differences in
average client outcomes. The
impressions of Institute caseworkers,
however, indicate that welfare recipients
participating in the II-A program are on
average more motivated than the typical
Work First participant.

Conclusion
Observations of local welfare-to-work
programs administered by the Upjohn
Institute are consistent with evaluations of
other programs. Rapid employment
programs do about as well getting welfare
recipients into jobs as programs with
more extensive training, although
earnings and hours worked are lower. The

question for all of these programs is
whether rapid entry into the labor market
offers future self-sufficiency. In most
cases, the answer is no. Even the
Riverside Program, considered to be the
most successful welfare-to-work
program evaluated to date, does not
promise lasting results. Three years after
entering the program, only 23 percent of
the participants were still employed and
off AFDC. Furthermore, the earnings do
little to lift welfare recipients out of
poverty. In California overall, only 20
percent of the participants had annual
incomes above the poverty rate after three
years. For the Kalamazoo Work First
program, the earnings are not sufficient to
reduce the poverty rate to any significant
degree. The average weekly earnings at
placement, assuming clients work all
year, would place a family of two at about
85 percent of the poverty income
threshold and a family of four at 56
percent. Getting people off welfare and
into jobs is a first and important step,
however. Once work experience is
established, additional education and
training, either on the job or in the
classroom, will help to increase earnings
and job stability and lead to selfsufficiency.

Suggested Readings
Judith M. Gueron and Edward Pauly,
From Welfare to Work, New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1991.
Daniel Friedlander and Gary Burtless,
Five Years Later: The Long Term Effects
of Welfare-to-work Programs, New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995.
What's Working (and what's not): A
Summary of Research on the Economic
Impacts of Employment and Training
Programs. U.S. Department of Labor,
Office of the Chief Economist, January
1995.
Timothy J. Bartik, "Using Performance
Indicators to Improve the Effectiveness
of Welfare-to-work Programs,"
Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research, Working
Paper, June 1995.
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Christopher}. O'Leary

Performance Management
of Active Labor Programs
in Eastern Europe
nemployment in Hungary and
Poland has risen dramatically since late
1989 when privatization and economic
reform began to accelerate. The overnight
disappearance of the Soviet market and
elimination of state subsidies and price
controls transformed these shortage
economies into labor surplus economies.
Registered unemployment in Hungary
rose from 23,000 in 1990 to 705,000 in
1993 in a labor force of close to 5 million.
Since then the Hungarian unemployment
rate has fallen somewhat, but remains in
double-digits, with total employment
having fallen by 25 percent since 1990.
Officially measured unemployment in
Poland jumped from zero in 1989 to 16.4
percent in 1994. During this period,
Polish civilian employment declined by
more than 2 million. Figure 1 summarizes
these unemployment trends.
To ease the hardship associated with
worker dislocation and to maintain social
stability, the governments of Hungary and
Poland acted quickly to create

unemployment compensation systems,
along with a variety of active labor
programs. Policy measures adopted in the
two countries include nearly the full menu
of active labor programs found in nations,
with developed market economies:
placement service, retraining, selfemployment assistance, wage subsidy,
public service employment, job creation
investments, work sharing, and early
retirement subsidy. These are summarized
in Figure 2.
Since 1990, the Upjohn Institute has
worked with the Ministry of Labor in
Hungary to develop evaluation and
planning procedures for labor market
support programs. In 1993, the Institute
initiated a similar project in Poland. The
projects have been coordinated by the
World Bank and the U.S. Department of
Labor.
Given the disappointing historical
experience Hungary and Poland had with
central planning, both countries have
sought ways to manage employment

Figure 1. Registered Unemployment Rate, Hungary and Poland, 1989-94
Rate of unemployment (%)
20 r

Poland
Hungary

15
10
5
0

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

policy in a decentralized way. In each
country, the legal framework of program
options is established by national
legislation. Funding for employment
measures is allocated to the provincial
governments, which then implement
specific program activities to address
regional needs. To support decentralized
decision making, while at the same time
requiring accountability and efficiency
from provincial governments, both
Poland and Hungary are establishing
performance-based management systems
for evaluation and planning of their active
labor programs.
The management systems include
performance indicators specified to
measure the success of each active labor
program in the different provinces and
local areas. The guiding principle in
developing performance indicators was to
emphasize outcomes rather than
processes. This emphasis was particularly
important in government agencies where,
until recently, hoarding of resources and
organization building had been primary
goals.
The performance indicators focus on
desired outcomes such as employment in
private unsubsidized jobs. They are timely
measures that can be readily implemented
and should become a natural tool for
managers. They are intentionally simple,
so as to minimize the data collection
burden on provincial governments. The
plan is to adjust performance targets for
the local economic conditions and client
mix. Such adjustment will make
comparisons across provinces and
programs more fair. In addition, the
adjustments for client mix should
discourage provincial governments from
attempting to boost reported performance
through the practice of creaming—
inflating a program's success rate by
limiting services to only the most
qualified applicants. By adjustment
weights, performance standards will be
relaxed for provinces providing services
to low skilled, low-educated, long-term
unemployed or other specified hard to
reemploy groups. Such targeting of
services will raise the social dividend of
employment policy.

Employment Research
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In November, the Upjohn Institute will
conduct training in performance
management of active labor programs for
all 49 provincial labor offices in Poland.
In 1993, similar training was completed
in Hungary for all 20 county labor
centers.

the effective use and control of the
decentralized Employment Fund.
One year after follow-up surveys
began, a national conference on the
experience with performance indicators
was held at the National Labor Center in
Budapest. Wide-ranging comments about

Figure 2. Active Labor Programs in Hungary and Poland
Active labor program
Placement service
Retraining
Self-employment assistance
Wage subsidy for hiring

Hungary
Yes
Yes
Yes
Long term unemployed

Poland
Yes
Yes
Yes
Recent graduates

Public service employment
Job creation investments
Work sharing
Early retirement subsidy

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
No
No

1. Poland also has Intervention Works projects operated by private sector employers.

The experience of Hungary illustrates
the process of system development.
Following months of debate, providing
users of the system a strong sense of
ownership and control, consensus on the
list of performance indicators was
reached in October 1992. Deliberations
involved representatives from the
Ministry, National Labor Center, Labor
Research Institute, Budapest University
of Economics, three county labor centers,
and the Upjohn Institute. To illustrate,
performance indicators for retraining
programs were specified to be:
Average cost per trainee employed at
follow-up
Proportion of trainees employed at followup
Average cost per training program entrant
Proportion of entrants who successfully
complete training
Average monthly earnings of trainees
employed at follow-up
Proportion of employed trainees working in
occupation of training at follow-up

The performance indicators system
was then pilot tested in three Hungarian
counties. Despite some reluctance at
senior management levels, nationwide
implementation of performance
management began in 1994. The impetus
to set the system in motion came from a
1993 Auditor General report questioning

the system were offered from the 20
counties and from federal representatives.
Due to the impact on survey response
rates and the minimal dispersion in
occupational wage distribution, the
reemployment wage indicator of
.
reemployment job quality was eliminated.
While the federal partners at the
meeting assured counties that the
performance indicator results would be
regarded as preliminary and used for
developing an adjustment methodology
for inter-county comparison, the counties
themselves cited a variety of immediate
uses of the information. The counties
reported the information to be particularly
valuable in assessing contract service
providers. It was also noted that the
impending reduction of active labor
programs to four retraining, public
service employment, wage subsidies for
long term unemployed, and self
employment assistance will likely
simplify the system and speed
implementation of the computerized
system to support performance
management.
The Ministry of Labor in Hungary is
currently revising the annual planning and
budget allocation process for active labor
programs. Master plans for the counties
and Ministry will be set in place and

guidelines for county annual plans based
in part on program performance will be
prepared. The Ministry is considering an
algorithm which weights program
performance 10 percent in budget
allocation decisions. Guidelines for
performance-based contracts to service
providers are also under consideration.
The Ministry is pursuing a positive
approach to performance management by
emphasizing high performance, with the
likely response to poor performance
being management assistance to counties.
In the past, the transfer of knowledge
about employment policy has been from
the mature market economies to the lessdeveloped countries. Even the
performance management systems
developed in Hungary and Poland are
adapted from methods used in nations
with developed market economies. But
because programs in Hungary and Poland
are operated in a coordinated way, the
systems provide a simultaneous view of
the effectiveness of all programs, thereby
clearly revealing policy trade-offs. These
management systems are models for
other nations in Central and Eastern
Europe, and they may also provide
insights for nations with much longer
histories of employment policy.
Christopher J. O'Leary is a senior economist
at the Upjohn Institute.

Suggested Readings
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No. 94-005. Kalamazoo: W. E. Upjohn
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Abt Associates Inc.
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University of Wisconsin-Madison

Program evaluation is a vital phase
in the policy-making process. Without
the ability to
accurately
PROGRAM
measure the
APPLICANTS
effects of past
asa/
r «mparisbn
policies, new, more
up in
effective policies
EVALUATING
TRAINING
cannot be
PROGRAMS
designed and
implemented.
Experimental
evaluations with
random assignments to comparison
groups provide reliable estimates of
program impact. But this technique
cannot be used in all situations.
Recognizing the need for practical
alternatives to experimental
evaluations, as well as the drawbacks
to the various nonexperimental
evaluation techniques, the authors
reintroduce the use of applicant-based,
internal comparison groups. They
update this methodology, which was
first used in the 1960s, then test it
against the random experimental
findings derived from a controlled
experiment.
This book is essential for anyone
interested in evaluation methodology.
1995. 183 pp. $14 paper ISBN 0-88099-157-7
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Pathways to
Change
Case Studies
of Strategic Negotiations
Joel E. Cutcher-Gershenfeld
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Richard E. Walton
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Rising litigation rates in state
workers' compensation systems are
often blamed for the rising costs of
workers' compensation insurance.
Yet, until now there has been little
empirical research on the
characteristics of injured workers and
their employers that affect litigation
decisions.
By applying econometric analysis
to case data from two states, Falaris,
Link, and Staten
are able to
identify the
economic
incentives that
influence the
WORKERS
probability
of
COMPENSATION
litigation in
workers'
compensation
cases, and the
probability that a contested case is
pursued to verdict. Factors identified
that influence these litigation decisions
include:
state regulation of workers'
compensation insurance pricing
type of industry
part of body injured and type of
injury
age of injured worker
An overview of the evolution of
state workers' compensation systems
is presented, along with the reforms
implemented to try to stem the rising
incidence of litigation.

The authors present and analyze a
dozen detailed case studies that point
out the various
strategic pathways
used in today's
labormanagement
relations. These
cases clearly
display the two
main change
strategies
forcing (a highly
contentious strategy) and fostering (a
highly cooperative strategy) that
together account for two-thirds of all
collective bargaining efforts.
Three cases document the use of
forcing, the hard bargaining change
strategy generally instigated by
management and then matched by
labor. Three more cases document
fostering, an attempt to advance
common or complimentary interests
through attitude change, persuasion,
and problem solving. Three cases show
the use of sequenced forcing-fostering
strategies, and three cases focus on the
use of combined forcing-fostering
strategies, the most complex
negotiating pathway.
Finally, the authors examine the
atmosphere in which negotiated
change occurs by focusing on
important environmental factors.
This book is from the preeminent
authorities on industrial relations.

1995. 137 pp. $14 paper ISBN 0-88099-161-5
$24 cloth ISBN 0-88099-162-3

1995. 265 pp. $17 paper ISBN 0-88099-155-0
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